kmiainfo: Abdel Nasser and Sayyid Qutb are not rivals in everything, this is how political Islam meets Arab nationalism :E-International Relations Abdel Nasser and Sayyid Qutb are not rivals in everything, this is how political Islam meets Arab nationalism :E-International Relations

Abdel Nasser and Sayyid Qutb are not rivals in everything, this is how political Islam meets Arab nationalism :E-International Relations

عبد الناصر وسيد قطب ليسا خصمين في كل شيء.. هكذا يلتقي الإسلام السياسي مع القومية العربية  E-International Relations في عام في 1952 في مصر، وصل جمال عبد الناصر إلى السلطة إبان انقلاب الضباط الأحرار بدعم من الإخوان المسلمين، ليصبح بطلا قوميا عربيا فيما بعد. بحلول عام 1954، ألغى ناصر جماعة الإخوان وجعل الحركة الإسلامية في خبر كان. تلخص هذه الواقعة كلًّا من وحشية وتناقض العلاقات بين الإسلاموية والقومية العربية. ومع ذلك، فإن هذا التناقض في بادئ الأمر محير للغاية؛ في الواقع، يبدو أن لمحة تاريخية ومفاهيمية عامة تشير إلى عدم توافق واضح ومعارضة بين هاتين الأيديولوجيتين السياسيتين الكبيرتين في القرن العشرين.  يجدر الإشارة إلى أنه تم تعريف القومية العربية في هذا النص على أنها الإيمان بأن جميع المتحدثين بالعربية يشكلون أمة ويجب أن يكونوا موحدين ومستقلين، وتم استخدام مصطلح الإسلاموية كمرادف للإسلام السياسي؛ أي الأيديولوجية السياسية التي تسعى لإنشاء دولة إسلامية على أساس الشريعة الإسلامية. تتشارك كلٌّ من القومية العربية والإسلاموية تاريخا حافلا من المواجهات العنيفة على مر القرن الماضي. علاوة على ذلك، تبدو هذه المواجهة -منطقيا- نابعة من عداء أيديولوجي جوهري. ووفقا لكتاب بندكت أندرسون "المجتمعات المتخيلة"، فإن الأيديولوجية القومية تحل محل الدين وهي علمانية بطبيعتها أو تمثل على الأقل تحديا وتركيزا متنافسا للولاء تجاه الهوية أو السلطة الدينية. علاوة على ذلك، يرى بيتر ماندافيل أن هذه الأيديولوجية -التي تساوي بين السيادة والأمة- تتعارض مع المبدأ الإسلامي المحافظ "الحكم لله" الذي يعرّف السيادة كملك وسلطان حصري لله.  سيد قطب (يمين) وجمال عبد الناصر لذلك، وجب على كل شيء معارضتهم، غير مفسحٍ أي مجال للتناقض. ولكن كيف لو كانتا حقا أيديولوجيتين منفصلتين "محكمتين"، هل يمكن أن يفسر أحدهم نمط انبثاقهما المشترك المثير للفضول؛ إذ إن نمت جذورهما الفكرية في أواخر القرن التاسع عشر وظهرت أول مظاهرهم السياسية المهمة في فترة ما بين الحربين العالميتين؟ كيف يمكن تفسير العديد من الاتصالات بين الأيديولوجيين (مؤيدي أيديولوجية ما) والأيديولوجيات؟ وإذا تفحصنا هذه النقطة أكثر وخالفنا وجهة النظر المعارضة، فإن الادعاء بأن القومية العربية والإسلاموية هما في الواقع "وجهان لعملة واحدة" سيكون قد تم تحقيقه. في هذا المنظور، ستكون الحركتان مجرد "تعبيرين" مختلفين لأمر واحد؛ تم تحديد هذا الأمر على أنه رفض للتأثيرات الغربية، أي على توالي القوى الاستعمارية الأوروبية أولا والهيمنة الأميركية لاحقا.  في تقييم هذه الادعاءات والفصل بينهما، سيحاول هذا المقال تجنب المحاذير المنهجية. من ناحية، رفض إعادة النظر في الأيديولوجيات، أي النظر إليها كمجموعات ثابتة وغير متغيرة من الأفكار، إذ سيعترف هذا المقال بأهمية الديناميات التاريخية والسياسية والاجتماعية في تشكيلها. كما يقول ديل إيكلمان: "لا توجد هذه النماذج كأمور يمكن نزعها من السياقات الاجتماعية والثقافية". سيكون هذا العنصر ذا صلة خاصة بمسألة الهوية التي تم تعريفها هنا على أنها بناء اجتماعي بُنِيَ مضمنا وجود "الآخر"، بالمعنى المسند إليه من قِبل عالم الأنثروبولوجيا فريدريك بارث مؤلف كتاب "لا هوية بدون تمييز" الصادر عام 1969. من ناحية أخرى، يسعى هذا المقال إلى عدم إغفال حقيقة أن هذه الأيديولوجيات ليست أمورا فارغة؛ فعلى الرغم من أنها تتغير مع مرور الوقت وتشكلها عوامل غير تابعة لفكر معين، فإنها تمتلك محتوى، ورؤية مفصّلة للعالم بشكل وبآخر، وهي في نهاية المطاف عن قيم وأهداف لا يمكن للمرء اعتبارها غير ذات صلة وأهمية.   ضمن هذا الإطار، سيتم التطرق إلى السؤال التالي: هل الإسلاموية والوحدة العربية هما أيديولوجيتان منفصلتان ومتعارضتان، أم أنهما ظاهرة واحدة تتخذ شكلين مختلفين؟ أولا، سيؤدي هذا المقال إلى إبطال وجهة نظر "المعارضة"، ويُظهِر بدلا من ذلك أن الحركتين متشابكتان ومتداخلتان بطرق مختلفة. وثانيا، سيُثبت أن كلتيهما يمكن بالفعل أن تُعرّفا بشكل صحيح على أنهما ردود فعل تجاه الغرب حيث تحركهما الهوية. ولكنه سيجادل بعد ذلك بأن النظر إليهما على أنهما مجرد أشكال مختلفة من هذا الرفض، قد يغفل عن المضمون الأيديولوجي لكليهما، وستكون بمنزلة لبس بين الأصل والأساس حسب شروط ديكارت. ومن ثم، فإن هذا المقال سوف يحمل وجهة النظر القائلة بأن الإسلاموية والقومية العربية حركتان مترابطتان بشكل وثيق حيث إنهما متحدتان ومختلفتان في آنٍ واحد من خلال علاقتهما بالغرب: كلتاهما ظهرتا كرفض للغرب، ولكن تستند كل منهما في كفاحها وموقفها إلى أسس أيديولوجية مختلفة جوهريا.  الفيلسوف الفرنسي رينيه ديكارت  (مواقع التواصل الاجتماعي)الفيلسوف الفرنسي رينيه ديكارت  (مواقع التواصل الاجتماعي) نمط معقد من التفاعل الاجتماعي إن التحقيق في التاريخ الفكري والسياسي للإسلاموية والقومية العربية يرسم صورة تنوع واسع من أنماط التفاعل الاجتماعي ويدحض بالتأكيد نموذج النظرة الساذجة للمعارضة. الأكثر دقة، أنه يدل على مسارين مرتبطين بشكل وثيق يصوغ كل منهما الآخر من خلال مجموعة متنوعة من العلاقات، بدءا من التعايش إلى استغلالها كأدوات.  أولا، كملاحظة أولية، يمكن للمرء أن يشير إلى أن المذهبين الأصليين بعيدان عن أن يكونا غريبين تماما عن بعضهما البعض، وأن المؤسسين الأوائل لم يصمموهما بروح المواجهة أو عدم التوافق. على جانب الوحدة العربية، أشار المؤسس الأيديولوجيّ لحزب البعث، ميشيل عفلق: "لقد تم إحياء قوة الإسلام لتظهر في أيامنا في شكل جديد، ألا وهو القومية العربية". كما نصح المسيحيين العرب أن يعرفوا الإسلام وأن يحبوا هذا الدين الجديد كما هو، كما صاغ ذلك في كلماته: يكمن "العنصر الأكثر قيمة" في القومية. وبالمثل، فعلى الجانب الإسلامي، جادل رشيد رضا -وهو نفسه الذي اعتبر الخلافة ضرورة- بأن المسلمين يستطيعون إدراك النظام الأخلاقي للإسلام داخل حدود الدولة القومية. في الواقع، خلال سنوات الحرب، كانت الحركات الراديكالية الأقلية -مثل حزب التحرير- تسعى في الواقع إلى جمع الأمة تحت حكم الخلافة. لا تهدف هذه الملاحظات إلى إبطال الاختلافات الأيديولوجية بين هاتين الحركتين، بل تؤكد ببساطة عدم دقة النهج "المعارض" القوي للغاية والذي من شأنه أن يثبتهما بأثر رجعي في صيغتهما الأكثر راديكالية.  ثانيا، إن التاريخ السياسي للحركتين لا يعني بأي حال من الأحوال أن يتسم بالمواجهة المحضة أكثر من أصولهما الفكرية. في الواقع، لقد كان الصراع على السلطة المتغلغل في السياسة والإسلاموية والعلاقات القومية العربية -في بعض الأحيان- صراعا تأسيسيا متبادلا. سلط العديد الضوء على الدور الحاسم الذي لعبه الإسلام والإسلاميون في الحركات القومية ومساعي بناء الدولة -من عصر ما بين الحربين إلى أوائل الحرب العالمية الثانية- كأساس واعٍ للتعبئة أو كقوة فاعلة في صنع سلطة الدولة. وعلى العكس، فقد أثرت عمليات بناء الدولة هذه أيضا على ممارسات الشريعة ومفهومها، كما حدث في ماليزيا أو شبه الجزيرة العربية. وقد اتخذت هذه التفاعلات شبه التكافلية شكل الاستغلال أو -على الأقل- للديناميكيات السياسية حيث تمكن كل طرف من استخدام الآخر كأداة لتحقيق أهدافه الخاصة.  وهكذا، يتخطى استخدام القوميين العرب للإسلام، فعلى سبيل المثال، تم استخدام النظام الديني كأداة لحشد الدعم المحلي والإقليمي لأجندته الاشتراكية العربية -ولا سيما من خلال جامعة الأزهر- التي تستخدم كوسيلة لإشاعة الشرعية العربية؛ أو كما تذرّع صدام حسين بالدين بشكل متكرر لحشد العرب خلال حرب الخليج عام 1991؛ وهكذا تم استخدام الإسلاموية في حد ذاتها كأداة من قِبل الدولة القومية، وهذا ما حصل في لحظة عودة ظهور الإسلاموية بعد سبعينيات القرن الماضي. في باكستان وجنوب شرق آسيا على سبيل المثال، لم تنشأ الأسلمة كتحدٍّ للدولة فقط، ولكنها في الواقع عززت دول ما بعد الاستعمار -خاصة الباكستانية والماليزية- من خلال تزويدهم بأداة أيديولوجية والتي كانت تنقصهم سابقا. وتجسد مقاربة الدولة القوية التي يتبناها الإسلاميون في الشرق الأوسط الديناميكية العكسية.  صدام حسين ما ينبع من هذا التحليل هو أن نهج المعارضة والنزاع يبدو مغالطة؛ الإسلاموية والقومية العربية ليستا أيديولوجيتين متناقضتين متلازمتين تماما ولا علاقة لهما ببعضهما سوى المعارضة والنزاع. إن مثل هذه النظرة تحجب التاريخ المعقد المتشابك لهاتين الحركتين المتطورتين إلى حد كبير، والتي يمكن اعتبارها في العديد من النواحي أساسا متبادلا. ومع ذلك، فإن إبطال هذه النظرة يعني بالضرورة أن العكس هو الصحيح. بعبارة أخرى، القول بأن نموذج المعارضة والنزاع في الغالب غير دقيق هو أمر معين من جهة، أما ادعاء أن الإسلام السياسي والعروبة هما شكلان لأمر واحد "وجهان لعملة واحدة" هو أمر آخر بالطبع. والسؤال الذي ينبغي للمرء محاولة الإجابة عنه الآن هو ما إذا كان من الممكن تجاوز هذا التنوع من التفاعلات الموصوفة أعلاه وتحديد عنصر موحد يبرر مثل هذا الادعاء.  رفض مشترك للغرب سيتبيّن أولا أن كلا من الإسلاموية والعروبة تظهران كرد فعل على الاختراق الغربي للمنطقة ولهما وظائف اجتماعية مماثلة في هذا الصدد. يمكن -إلى حد ما- النظر إلى الحركتين بشكل صحيح على أنهما شكلان من هذا الرفض. تتمثل أول إشارة لوجود عنصر مشترك قوي في الملاحظة التالية: يبدو أن الوحدة العربية والإسلاموية ترتبطان بعلاقة عكسية: عندما ترتفع إحداهما تنحدر الأخرى، وعندما تهيمن إحداهما تتهمش الأخرى. يمكن القول إن هذه العلاقة تعود إلى أوائل القرن العشرين، قبل الحرب العالمية الأولى. فوفقا لكارين دويشا، كانت الهوية الإسلامية أقوى بكثير بين العرب من المفهوم الجديد والهامشي للأمة العربية.  تم عكس هذه العلاقة فقط بعد الحرب العالمية الثانية وتحديدا في بداية الخمسينيات؛ حيث تغلبت القومية العربية على الإسلاموية؛ إذ تم النظر إلى القومية العربية على أنها مرتبطة -على نحو واقعي- في الأقاليم المحلية واللغة والتاريخ والتجربة أكثر من الأمة المجردة والمشتتة. و"اختفت" الإسلاموية تقريبا من مسرح العلاقات الدولية، بينما تصاعدت القومية العربية ووصلت إلى ذروتها في الستينيات في ظل قيادة ناصر ومشاريع الجمهورية العربية المتحدة. شهد تراجع العروبة بعد عام 1967 عودة ظهور الإسلاموية وبدأ التوازن العكسي في التبلور. ولتفسير هذه العلاقة المذهلة، يجب على المرء أن يفهم ما الذي يربط بين القومية العربية والإسلاموية. وبالتالي، الانتباه إلى أصلهما المشترك؛ هذا الأصل موجود في رفض القوة الاستعمارية الأوروبية التي توجد في صميم ظهور الحركتين وانتشارهما.  أما بالنسبة للإسلاموية، فقد وصف جمال الدين الأفغاني أحد أيديولوجياته المبكّرة "الإمبريالية الأوروبية" بأنها تجربة مشتركة بين المسلمين، وسعى إلى تعبئة المشاعر المعادية للاستعمار حول شعور متجدد بوعي الأمة. وبالمثل، كان حسن البنا الذي أسس جماعة الإخوان المسلمين عام 1928 يهتم بالتغريب الثقافي للعالم الإسلامي وفقدان التقاليد الإسلامية. وفقا لآرشین أدیب مقدم: "ليس من المبالغة للغاية" تعميم ذلك على الإسلاميين الحداثيين من عبده إلى الخميني وسيد قطب وأبو الأعلى المودودي وحسن البنا ومحمد إقبال؛ كان الإسلام بالنسبة لهم هو الحل للانحدار الاجتماعي والسياسي والاقتصادي والثقافي للأمة مقارنة بالغرب. بالنسبة لراينهارد شولتسه، حتى مفهوم الدولة الإسلامية هو رد فعل على الدولة القومية الغربية، وبالنسبة للكثير من المؤلفين، فإن الإسلاموية هي أيضا استجابة لظهور الصهيونية التي تعتبر مشروعا غربيا.  جمال الدين الأفغاني (مواقع التواصل) ويمكن إجراء التحليل نفسه تماما على القومية العربية التي ترى نفسها أيضا وسيلة لدحر الهيمنة الغربية في المنطقة. ومن الأمثلة الواضحة على ذلك الحدث "التأسيسي" للوحدة العربية: تأميم عبد الناصر لقناة السويس في عام 1956، وهو عمل استهدف بشكل مباشر القوى الأوروبية الاستعمارية السابقة، وتلاه مظاهرات عربية ضخمة مناهضة للغرب أعقبتها مظاهرات في ليبيا والمغرب والأردن وسوريا ولبنان والعراق والكويت وقطر والبحرين واليمن. ومن الواضح إذن أن كلا الحركتين تبرزان من نفس مصفوفة الهوية المعادية للغرب. بعبارة أخرى، لا يقتصر دورها على الحركات القائمة على الهوية فحسب، بل إنها قامت ببناء هذه الهوية ضد "الآخر" نفسه: الغرب. وبالتالي، فإنهما تتشاركان بالضرورة الخصائص الأساسية: فهما لديهما الهدف نفسه -حيث ينظر إليهما على أنهما المصدر الشرعي لتعريف الهويات الجماعية- وهو ما يعني ضمنا القتال من أجل شيء واحد: "الأصالة"، أو كما وصفته داويشا "المكان في قلب العرب" وجمهور واحد. كلتاهما استجابت للانشغال المجتمعي نفسه -المتشكل في القلق من التراجع والانحدار والحاجة إلى استعادة صورة ذاتية إيجابية- ومحاولة تقديم إجابات عن الأسئلة نفسها والتحدي المتمثل في الحداثة التي يهيمن عليها الغرب. وبالتالي، فإن نجاحاتهما أو إخفاقاتهما تخضع للمعايير نفسها لأنهما قادرتان على الوفاء بالوعود نفسها. يبدو أن هذا الإطار يستطيع فقط تفسير وشرح العلاقة العكسية الموضحة أعلاه. مثلا، يمكن للمرء أن يضع بعضا من أكثر الوعود الحاسمة من حيث تأثيرها على مصير الأيديولوجيتين، ومن هذه الوعود تحرير فلسطين وتحقيق مساواة اقتصادية أفضل.   نبع ظهور الإسلاموية مجددا من إخفاق القومية العربية في تحرير فلسطين عام 1967، بعد حرب يونيو/حزيران الخاسرة ضد إسرائيل. في هذه اللحظة، تفوز الإسلاموية بالمعركة الأيديولوجية حول القضية نفسها التي خسرتها بعد الحرب العالمية الثانية: القدرة على تمثيل قوة معادية للغرب ذات مصداقية؛ منتقدة القومية العربية لكونها مجرد تقليد للمؤسسات الأوروبية، فقد تمكنت بعد ذلك من تنصيب نفسها نهجا أصيلا لا مثيل له للتخلص من النفوذ الغربي. يمكن طرح برهان مماثل في مجال الاقتصاد السياسي: عندما أثبتت القوى القومية العربية في سبعينيات القرن الماضي -التي واجهت الأزمة الاقتصادية- أنها غير قادرة على الوفاء بوعدها الاشتراكي بالمساواة الاقتصادية، فقد برزت الإسلاموية كبديل، واقتُرح نموذج إسلامي جديد للعدالة الاجتماعية الاقتصادية.    قد يكون من المغري أن نستنتج من هذا النظام الظاهر لـِ"الأواني المستطرقة"** أن العروبة والإسلاموية هما في الحقيقة جانبان للظاهرة نفسها أو "وجهان لعملة واحدة"، وهذه الظاهرة هي رفض هيمنة الغرب. على الرغم من أن الحركتين هما تعبيران مختلفان عن الرأي المعادي للغرب، فإن وضعهما ضمن هذا الإطار فقط سيكون غير مُرضٍ. إن مثل هذا النموذج سوف يغفل تماما المحتوى الفعلي والدوافع الفكرية الداخلية لكلتا الأيديولوجيتين؛ العناصر التي لها أهمية كبيرة سواء من حيث علاقتهما مع بعضهما البعض أو من حيث تأثيرهما على العلاقات الدولية الإقليمية والعالمية.  أدوات أيديولوجية متباينة بعبارة أخرى، كلتاهما رد فعل للغرب، لكن ردود الفعل هذه هي في حد ذاتها مختلفة جوهريا. في الواقع، هما لا ترفضان العناصر نفسها في الهيمنة الغربية. إنهما لا تقاتلان الغرب على المستوى نفسه، وبطريقة ما إنهما لا تعارضان ذات الغرب. فبينما تحارب القومية العربية قوة عسكرية وسياسية، تحارب الإسلاموية نفوذا وتأثيرا أيديولوجيًّا. لقد كانت لحظة الانتقال لعام 1967 مفيدة في هذا الصدد؛ عندما انتقد الإسلاميون فشل الدول القومية العربية في إلحاق الهزيمة بإسرائيل، لم يخاطب هذا الانتقاد عدم كفاءة القومية العربية أو حتى عدم صلة المشروع القومي العربي الذي يقع في قلب الهجوم، بل بالأحرى ما يسمى "الإفلاس الأخلاقي" للدول القومية العلمانية المبنية على النموذج الغربي. إن اعتبار هذا الانتقاد موقفا انتهازيا بحتا يمليه صراع على السلطة سيكون لا شك بأنه ينطوي على مغالطة ويقلل من مصداقية هذا الانتقاد. في الواقع، تبدو هذه النظرة الإسلامية متجذرة في العقيدة الأصلية للحركة والتي رغم أنها لم تكن تدعو إلى المواجهة في لحظة تشكيلها وأصبحت متطرفة مع مرور الوقت (لا سيما نتيجة لصراعاتها مع القومية العربية وما تضمنته من القمع الوحشي في بعض الأحيان).  كما يفسرها جون إسبوسيتو: "بالنسبة إلى قطب -كما هو بالنسبة للبنا والمودودي- فإن الغرب هو العدو التاريخي والمترسخ للإسلام والمجتمعات الإسلامية، سواء كان تهديدا سياسيا أو دينيا. وتكمن خطورة الغرب الواضحة في سيطرته على النخب المسلمة التي تحكم وتوجه بالمعايير الغريبة عنها". نتيجة لذلك، لم يكن انتقاد الإسلاموية مرتبطا بالشكوى ضد الأنظمة القومية العربية فحسب، بل قدّم بشكل أساسي إدانة أخلاقية للنظريات السياسية في مرحلة ما بعد عصر التنوير. وبالفعل، فإن هذا المفهوم القومي العربي كونه نتاج الأيديولوجيات الغربية له ما يبرره. استعار مؤسس الفكر القومي العربي ساطع الحصري من كتابات المدرسة القومية الألمانية في العصر الرومانسي، وتم تأطير ولادة المشاعر القومية العربية في شروط وودرو ويلسون، كنضال من أجل "تقرير المصير".  يمكن العثور على مظاهر مهمة لهذه الفجوة الأيديولوجية في سياسات التعليم القومية؛ في الدول القومية الجديدة في مرحلة ما بعد الاستقلال، يتم تعزيز التعليم العلماني بقوة، كما هو واضح في مصر حيث يتوسع تعداد المدارس بمقدار 800,000 في السنوات المحيطة بعام 1952. يبدو أن الانقسام الأيديولوجي الأساسي يتشكل هنا: إنه يعني ضمنا أنه على الرغم من أن الإسلاميين والقوميين العرب يكافحون الغرب على حد سواء، فإن كليهما لا يقودان المعركة ذاتها.  من جهة، كما يقول هيدلي بول: "كانت [القومية العربية] تعاني من آلام لاستيعاب الأعراف والقيم الغربية بينما تستخدمها لمحاربة الغرب كقوة سياسية وعسكرية ولكن ليس كحضارة. بهذا المعنى، تحتضن القومية العربية الأفكار الغربية". اعتماد القوميين العرب للخطاب التحرري الوطني والالتزام بالاشتراكية وتعزيز الأشكال الأوروبية للدولة يوضح تماما وجهة نظر بول. من ناحية أخرى، تقدم الإسلاموية نفسها على أنها رفض للأفكار الغربية (وهو ما وصفه سيد قطب بقوله: "هذه الفردية التي تفتقر إلى الشعور بالتكافل، تلك الحرية الحيوانية التي تسمى التسامح")، كما تدعو الإسلاموية إلى بناء نظام سياسي بديل قائم على القيم الإسلامية. في كثير من النواحي، تعتبر الإسلاموية السلاح الأيديولوجي "للحداثة الإسلامية" الموجه ضد الغرب. لم تمتلك القومية العربية سلاحا كهذا ولا تسعى لامتلاك واحد.  وبالتالي، فإن وجهة النظر التي تعرّف القومية العربية والإسلاموية -بغض النظر عن محتواهاا الأيديولوجي- على أنهما ظاهرتان أساسيتان لنفس ديناميكية مكافحة الهيمنة غير صحيحة. مثل هذا التعريف سيكون بمنزلة نهج اجتماعي وظيفي بشكل مفرط، والذي من شأنه تمزيق الأفكار عن الأيديولوجيات بطريقة ما. من الناحية المفاهيمية، من شأن ذلك التعريف أن يرتكب المغالطة التي يحذر ديكارت منها في خطابه حول الأسلوب: الخلط بين الأصل (في هذه الحالة، رد الفعل على التغلغل الغربي للشرق الأوسط) والأساس (المتمثل في رد الفعل هذا).  في تناول المسألة عما إذا كانت "القومية العربية والإسلاموية وجهان لعملة واحدة"، بدأ هذا المقال بتقييم الموقف المعارض، أي الشخص الذي يرى أن هذه الأيديولوجيات هما شيئان مختلفان تماما ويرتبطان ببعضهما فقط مواجهة بعضهما البعض. تم العثور على مجموعة متنوعة من التفاعلات والصلات بين هاتين الأيديولوجيتين، تم إبطال هذا الإدعاء. ثم تم برهنة نموذج موحد وأصل مشترك لهاتين الأيديولوجيتين ولكن تبين أنه غير كاف للمضي في الاتفاق مع الدوافع التي تمت مناقشتها. بعبارة أخرى، توصل هذا المقال إلى استنتاج مفاده أن القومية العربية والإسلاموية -المتشابكتان بشكل وثيق مع أصولهما- تنبثقان من مصفوفة الهوية نفسها المعادية للغرب، لكن فحوى ووسائل ومعاني هذا الرفض تختلف اختلافا جوهريا.  وعموما، تدور الإجابة عن هذه المقالة حول قضية علاقة هذه الحركات بالغرب التي تربط هاتين الأيديولوجيتين ببعضهما البعض وتميزهما عن بعضهما البعض. وبهذا المعنى، فإن التشبيه بالعملة قد لا يكون غير دقيق في نهاية الأمر. إذا كان الأمر أكثر من مجرد "وجهين" لشيء واحد، فهو يصف شيئين مختلفين تم اختلاقهما من المادة نفسها وموجّهين نحو اتجاهات مختلفة جذريا، وقد يشكل في الواقع صورة عادلة تماما لعلاقات الإسلاموية والعروبة.  ترجمة (آلاء أبو رميلة) هذا التقرير مترجم عن: E-International Relations ولا يعبر بالضرورة عن موقع ميدان.     Abdel Nasser and Sayyid Qutb are not rivals in everything, this is how political Islam meets Arab nationalism :E-International Relations  In 1952 in Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser came to power during the Free Officers coup with the support of the Muslim Brotherhood, to become an Arab national hero later. By 1954, Nasser had abolished the Brotherhood and brought the Islamist movement into question. This incident sums up both the brutality and contradiction of the relations between Islamism and Arab nationalism. However, this contradiction is at first very puzzling; Indeed, a general historical and conceptual overview seems to indicate a clear incompatibility and opposition between these two great political ideologies of the twentieth century.  It should be noted that Arab nationalism was defined in this text as the belief that all Arabic speakers constitute a nation and should be united and independent, and the term Islamism was used as a synonym for political Islam; That is, the political ideology that seeks to establish an Islamic state on the basis of Islamic law. Arab nationalism and Islamism share a history of violent confrontations over the past century. Moreover, this confrontation seems - logically - to stem from a fundamental ideological hostility. According to Benedict Anderson's book Imaginary Societies, nationalist ideology replaces religion and is secular in nature or at least represents a challenge and competing focus of loyalty toward religious identity or authority. Moreover, Peter Mandaville argues that this ideology - which equates sovereignty with the nation - is in conflict with the conservative Islamic principle of "governance for God" which defines sovereignty as the exclusive king and authority of God.  Sayed Qutb (right) and Gamal Abdel Nasser Therefore, everything had to oppose them, leaving no room for contradiction. But how if they are really two separate ideologies "hermetic", can someone explain their intriguing common pattern of emergence; If their intellectual roots grew in the late nineteenth century and their first important political manifestations appeared in the period between the two world wars? How can the many connections between ideologists (supporters of an ideology) and ideologies be explained? If we examine this point further and disagree with the opposing view, then the claim that Arab nationalism and Islamism are in fact “two sides of the same coin” would have been fulfilled. In this perspective, the two movements would be just two different "expressions" of one thing; This was identified as a rejection of Western influences, ie, successively European colonial powers first and American hegemony later.  In assessing and adjudicating these claims, this article will attempt to avoid methodological caveats. On the one hand, he refused to reconsider ideologies, i.e. view them as fixed and unchanging sets of ideas, as this article will acknowledge the importance of historical, political and social dynamics in their formation. As Dale Eckelman says, "these paradigms do not exist as things that can be taken out of social and cultural contexts." This element will be of particular relevance to the question of identity here defined as a social construct built implying the existence of the 'other', in the sense ascribed to it by anthropologist Frederick Barth, author of Identity Without Discrimination (1969). On the other hand, this article seeks not to lose sight of the fact that these ideologies are not empty things; Although it changes over time and is shaped by non-ideological factors, it has content, a detailed world view in one way or another, and is ultimately about values ​​and goals that one cannot consider irrelevant and important.  Within this framework, the following question will be addressed: Are Islamism and Arab unity two separate and opposing ideologies, or are they one phenomenon that takes two different forms? First, this article will invalidate the “opposition” viewpoint, showing instead that the two movements are intertwined and intertwined in different ways. Second, it will prove that both can indeed be correctly defined as reactions to the West driven by identity. But then he will argue that viewing them as mere different forms of this rejection might overlook the ideological content of both, and would amount to confusion between the original and the basis according to Descartes' terms. Hence, this article will carry the view that Islamism and Arab nationalism are closely interrelated movements in that they are simultaneously united and different in their relation to the West: both emerged as a rejection of the West, but each bases its struggle and stance on fundamentally different ideological foundations.  Complex pattern of social interaction An investigation of the intellectual and political history of Islamism and Arab nationalism paints a picture of a wide variety of modes of social interaction and certainly refutes the naïve opposition paradigm. More precisely, it signifies two closely related paths that shape each other through a variety of relationships, ranging from symbiosis to instrumentalization.  First, as a preliminary observation, one may point out that the two original doctrines are far from being completely alien to one another, and that the early founders did not design them in a spirit of confrontation or incompatibility. On the side of pan-Arabism, the ideological founder of the Ba'ath Party, Michel Aflaq, noted: "The power of Islam has been revived to appear in our days in a new form, namely, Arab nationalism." He also advised Arab Christians to know Islam and to love this new religion for what it is, as he put it in his own words: The "most valuable ingredient" is nationalism. Similarly, on the Islamic side, Rashid Rida - himself who considered the caliphate a necessity - argued that Muslims could perceive the moral order of Islam within the borders of the nation-state. In fact, during the war years, minority radical movements - such as Hizb ut-Tahrir - were actually seeking to bring the nation together under the rule of the Caliphate.  Second, the political history of the two movements does not mean in any way that it is more purely confrontational than their intellectual origins. In fact, the struggle for power that permeates politics, Islamism, and Arab national relations has been - at times - a mutual foundational struggle. Many have highlighted the critical role Islam and Islamists played in nationalist movements and state-building endeavors - from the interwar era to early World War II - as a conscious basis for mobilization or as an active force in the making of state power. Conversely, these state-building processes also affected the practice and concept of Sharia, as happened in Malaysia or the Arabian Peninsula. These quasi-symbiotic interactions took the form of exploitation or - at least - of political dynamics where each side was able to use the other as a tool to achieve its own goals.  Thus, the use of Islam by Arab nationalists goes beyond, for example, the religious regime has been used as a tool to mobilize local and regional support for its Arab socialist agenda - notably through Al-Azhar University - which is used as a means of spreading Arab legitimacy; or as Saddam Hussein repeatedly invoked religion to mobilize Arabs during the 1991 Gulf War; Thus, Islamism was itself used as a tool by the nation-state, and this is what happened at the moment of the re-emergence of Islamism after the seventies of the last century. In Pakistan and Southeast Asia for example, Islamization did not arise only as a challenge to the state, but in fact strengthened the post-colonial states - especially Pakistani and Malaysian - by providing them with an ideological tool that they previously lacked. The strong state approach of Islamists in the Middle East exemplifies the reverse dynamic.  Saddam Hussein What emerges from this analysis is that the opposition and conflict approach appears to be a fallacy; Islamism and Arab nationalism are not two contradictory ideologies that are completely inseparable and have nothing to do with each other except opposition and conflict. Such a view obscures the complex and intertwined histories of these two highly developed movements, which in many respects can be seen as a mutual basis. However, invalidating this view necessarily means that the opposite is true. In other words, saying that the model of opposition and conflict is often inaccurate is a certain thing on the one hand, while claiming that political Islam and Arabism are two forms of the same thing "two sides of the same coin" is another matter, of course. The question one should attempt to answer now is whether it is possible to go beyond this diversity of interactions described above and identify a unifying element that justifies such a claim.  A common rejection of the West It will first be seen that both Islamism and pan-Arabism emerge as a reaction to the Western penetration of the region and have similar social functions in this respect. To some extent, the two movements can be correctly seen as forms of this rejection. The first indication of a strong common element is the following observation: Arab and Islamic unity seem to have an inverse relationship: when one rises, the other declines, and when one dominates, the other marginalizes. It can be said that this relationship dates back to the early twentieth century, before the First World War. According to Karen Doisha, the Islamic identity was much stronger among Arabs than the new and marginal concept of the Arab nation.  This relationship was reversed only after World War II, specifically at the beginning of the fifties; Where Arab nationalism overcame Islamism; Arab nationalism was seen as linked - realistically - in local regions, language, history, and experience rather than the abstract and dispersed nation. Islamism almost “disappeared” from the international relations scene, while Arab nationalism rose and reached its zenith in the 1960s under the leadership of Nasser and the projects of the United Arab Republic. The decline of pan-Arabism after 1967 saw the re-emergence of Islamism and the reverse equilibrium began to take shape. To explain this astonishing relationship, one must understand what links Arab nationalism and Islamism. Hence, attention to their common origin; This origin is found in the rejection of the European colonial power that is at the heart of the emergence and spread of the two movements.  As for Islamism, one of his early ideologies, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, described "European imperialism" as a shared experience among Muslims, and sought to mobilize anti-colonial sentiment around a renewed sense of the nation's consciousness. Likewise, Hassan al-Banna, who founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, was concerned with the cultural westernization of the Islamic world and the loss of Islamic traditions. According to Arshin Adeeb Moghaddam: “It is not too exaggerated” to generalize this to the modernist Islamists from Abduh to Khomeini, Sayyid Qutb, Abu Al-Ala Mawdudi, Hassan Al-Banna and Muhammad Iqbal; For them, Islam was the solution to the social, political, economic and cultural decline of the nation compared to the West. For Reinhard Schulze, even the concept of the Islamic state is a reaction to the Western nation-state, and for many authors, Islamism is also a response to the emergence of Zionism, which is considered a Western project.  Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani The same analysis can be carried out exactly on Arab nationalism, which also sees itself as a means to roll back Western hegemony in the region. A clear example of this is the "foundational" event of Arab unity: Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956, an act that directly targeted former European colonial powers, followed by massive Arab anti-Western demonstrations followed by demonstrations in Libya, Morocco, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and Yemen . It is thus clear that both movements emerge from the same matrix of anti-Western identity. In other words, it is not only identity-based movements that have built this identity against the "other" itself: the West. Thus, they necessarily share basic characteristics: they have the same goal - they are seen as the legitimate source of defining collective identities - which implies a fight for one thing: "authenticity", or as Dawisha puts it. Thus, their successes or failures are subject to the same standards because they are able to deliver on the same promises. It seems that this framework can only explain and explain the inverse relationship shown above. For example, one could make some of the most decisive promises in terms of their bearing on the fate of the two ideologies, including the liberation of Palestine and better economic equality. Thus, their successes or failures are subject to the same standards because they are able to deliver on the same promises. It seems that this framework can only explain and explain the inverse relationship shown above. For example, one could make some of the most decisive promises in terms of their bearing on the fate of the two ideologies, including the liberation of Palestine and better economic equality.  The re-emergence of Islamism stemmed from the failure of Arab nationalism to liberate Palestine in 1967, after the losing June war against Israel. At the moment, Islamism is winning the ideological battle over the same issue it lost after World War II: the ability to represent a credible anti-Western force; Criticizing Arab nationalism for being a mere imitation of European institutions, it was then able to establish itself as an original and unparalleled approach to getting rid of Western influence. A similar argument can be made in the field of political economy: when Arab nationalist forces in the 1970s - facing the economic crisis - proved unable to fulfill their socialist promise of economic equality, Islamism emerged as an alternative, and a new Islamic model of socio-economic justice was proposed.  It may be tempting to conclude from this apparent system of “talkative pots”** that Arabism and Islamism are in fact two sides of the same phenomenon or “two sides of the same coin,” and this phenomenon is the rejection of the hegemony of the West. Although the two movements are different expressions of anti-Western opinion, placing them only within this framework would be unsatisfactory. Such a model would completely ignore the actual content and internal intellectual motives of both ideologies; Elements that are of great importance both in terms of their relationship with each other or in terms of their impact on regional and global international relations.  Divergent ideological tools In other words, they are both reactions of the West, but these reactions are themselves fundamentally different. In fact, they do not reject the same elements of Western hegemony. They do not fight the West on the same level, and in a way they are not opposed to the same West. While Arab nationalism is fighting a military and political force, Islamism is fighting ideological influence and influence. The 1967 transition moment was instrumental in this respect; When Islamists criticized the failure of Arab nation-states to defeat Israel, this criticism addressed not the incompetence of Arab nationalism or even the irrelevance of the Arab nationalist project at the center of the attack, but rather the so-called “moral bankruptcy” of secular nation-states built on the Western model. Considering this criticism a purely opportunistic position dictated by a power struggle would undoubtedly be a fallacy and reduce the credibility of this criticism.  As John Esposito explains it: "For Qutb - as for Al-Banna and Mawdudi - the West is the historical and entrenched enemy of Islam and Islamic societies, whether it is a political or religious threat. The obvious danger of the West lies in its control over the Muslim elites who rule and direct by standards alien to them." As a result, criticism of Islamism has not only been associated with complaints against Arab nationalist regimes, but has mainly provided a moral indictment of post-Enlightenment political theories. Indeed, this Arab nationalist concept as a product of Western ideologies is justified. The founder of Arab nationalist thought, Satih al-Husari, borrowed from the writings of the German Nationalist School of the Romantic era, and the birth of Arab nationalist sentiment is framed in Woodrow Wilson's terms, as a struggle for "self-determination".  Important manifestations of this ideological gap can be found in national education policies; In the new post-independence nation-states, secular education is strongly promoted, as is evident in Egypt where the school population expands by 800,000 in the years around 1952. A basic ideological divide seems to be forming here: it implies that although Islamists And Arab nationalists are fighting the West alike, for neither are leading the same battle.  On the one hand, as Hedley Poole puts it, "[Arab nationalism] has been on the pain of accommodating Western norms and values ​​while using them to fight the West as a political and military force but not as a civilization. In this sense, Arab nationalism embraces Western ideas." The Arab nationalists' adoption of national liberation discourse, commitment to socialism and the promotion of European forms of state perfectly illustrate Paul's view. On the other hand, Islamism presents itself as a rejection of Western ideas (which Sayyid Qutb described as “this individualism that lacks a sense of interdependence, that animal freedom that is called tolerance”), and Islamism calls for the construction of an alternative political system based on Islamic values . In many respects, Islamism is the ideological weapon of "Islamic modernity" directed against the West. Arab nationalism did not possess such a weapon and does not seek to possess one.  Thus, the view that defines Arab nationalism and Islamism - regardless of their ideological content - as two essential phenomena of the same anti-hegemonic dynamic is incorrect. Such a definition would amount to an overly functional sociological approach, which would somehow rip ideas off ideologies. Conceptually, that definition would commit the fallacy that Descartes warns about in his Discourse on Style: to confuse the origin (in this case, the reaction to the Western penetration of the Middle East) with the base (that reaction).  In addressing the question of whether “Arab nationalism and Islamism are two sides of the same coin,” this article began with an assessment of the opposing position, that is, one who sees these ideologies as two completely different things related only to confronting each other. A variety of interactions and connections are found between these two ideologies, and this claim has been invalidated. A unified model and common origin for these two ideologies were then demonstrated but found to be insufficient to proceed in agreement with the motives discussed. In other words, this article came to the conclusion that Arab nationalism and Islamism - closely intertwined with their origins - emerge from the same anti-Western identity matrix, but the tenor, means, and meanings of this rejection are fundamentally different.  In general, the answer to this article revolves around the issue of the relationship of these movements to the West, which links these two ideologies to each other and distinguishes them from each other. In this sense, the coin analogy may not be inaccurate after all. If it is more than just “two sides” of one thing, it describes two different things made up of the same material and oriented in radically different directions, and may in fact constitute a perfectly fair picture of the relations of Islamism and Arabism.( Alaa Abu Rumaila )

Abdel Nasser and Sayyid Qutb are not rivals in everything, this is how political Islam meets Arab nationalism :E-International Relations


In 1952 in Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser came to power during the Free Officers coup with the support of the Muslim Brotherhood, to become an Arab national hero later. By 1954, Nasser had abolished the Brotherhood and brought the Islamist movement into question. This incident sums up both the brutality and contradiction of the relations between Islamism and Arab nationalism. However, this contradiction is at first very puzzling; Indeed, a general historical and conceptual overview seems to indicate a clear incompatibility and opposition between these two great political ideologies of the twentieth century.

It should be noted that Arab nationalism was defined in this text as the belief that all Arabic speakers constitute a nation and should be united and independent, and the term Islamism was used as a synonym for political Islam; That is, the political ideology that seeks to establish an Islamic state on the basis of Islamic law. Arab nationalism and Islamism share a history of violent confrontations over the past century. Moreover, this confrontation seems - logically - to stem from a fundamental ideological hostility. According to Benedict Anderson's book Imaginary Societies, nationalist ideology replaces religion and is secular in nature or at least represents a challenge and competing focus of loyalty toward religious identity or authority. Moreover, Peter Mandaville argues that this ideology - which equates sovereignty with the nation - is in conflict with the conservative Islamic principle of "governance for God" which defines sovereignty as the exclusive king and authority of God.

Sayed Qutb (right) and Gamal Abdel Nasser
Therefore, everything had to oppose them, leaving no room for contradiction. But how if they are really two separate ideologies "hermetic", can someone explain their intriguing common pattern of emergence; If their intellectual roots grew in the late nineteenth century and their first important political manifestations appeared in the period between the two world wars? How can the many connections between ideologists (supporters of an ideology) and ideologies be explained? If we examine this point further and disagree with the opposing view, then the claim that Arab nationalism and Islamism are in fact “two sides of the same coin” would have been fulfilled. In this perspective, the two movements would be just two different "expressions" of one thing; This was identified as a rejection of Western influences, ie, successively European colonial powers first and American hegemony later.

In assessing and adjudicating these claims, this article will attempt to avoid methodological caveats. On the one hand, he refused to reconsider ideologies, i.e. view them as fixed and unchanging sets of ideas, as this article will acknowledge the importance of historical, political and social dynamics in their formation. As Dale Eckelman says, "these paradigms do not exist as things that can be taken out of social and cultural contexts." This element will be of particular relevance to the question of identity here defined as a social construct built implying the existence of the 'other', in the sense ascribed to it by anthropologist Frederick Barth, author of Identity Without Discrimination (1969). On the other hand, this article seeks not to lose sight of the fact that these ideologies are not empty things; Although it changes over time and is shaped by non-ideological factors, it has content, a detailed world view in one way or another, and is ultimately about values ​​and goals that one cannot consider irrelevant and important.

Within this framework, the following question will be addressed: Are Islamism and Arab unity two separate and opposing ideologies, or are they one phenomenon that takes two different forms? First, this article will invalidate the “opposition” viewpoint, showing instead that the two movements are intertwined and intertwined in different ways. Second, it will prove that both can indeed be correctly defined as reactions to the West driven by identity. But then he will argue that viewing them as mere different forms of this rejection might overlook the ideological content of both, and would amount to confusion between the original and the basis according to Descartes' terms. Hence, this article will carry the view that Islamism and Arab nationalism are closely interrelated movements in that they are simultaneously united and different in their relation to the West: both emerged as a rejection of the West, but each bases its struggle and stance on fundamentally different ideological foundations.

Complex pattern of social interaction
An investigation of the intellectual and political history of Islamism and Arab nationalism paints a picture of a wide variety of modes of social interaction and certainly refutes the naïve opposition paradigm. More precisely, it signifies two closely related paths that shape each other through a variety of relationships, ranging from symbiosis to instrumentalization.

First, as a preliminary observation, one may point out that the two original doctrines are far from being completely alien to one another, and that the early founders did not design them in a spirit of confrontation or incompatibility. On the side of pan-Arabism, the ideological founder of the Ba'ath Party, Michel Aflaq, noted: "The power of Islam has been revived to appear in our days in a new form, namely, Arab nationalism." He also advised Arab Christians to know Islam and to love this new religion for what it is, as he put it in his own words: The "most valuable ingredient" is nationalism. Similarly, on the Islamic side, Rashid Rida - himself who considered the caliphate a necessity - argued that Muslims could perceive the moral order of Islam within the borders of the nation-state. In fact, during the war years, minority radical movements - such as Hizb ut-Tahrir - were actually seeking to bring the nation together under the rule of the Caliphate.

Second, the political history of the two movements does not mean in any way that it is more purely confrontational than their intellectual origins. In fact, the struggle for power that permeates politics, Islamism, and Arab national relations has been - at times - a mutual foundational struggle. Many have highlighted the critical role Islam and Islamists played in nationalist movements and state-building endeavors - from the interwar era to early World War II - as a conscious basis for mobilization or as an active force in the making of state power. Conversely, these state-building processes also affected the practice and concept of Sharia, as happened in Malaysia or the Arabian Peninsula. These quasi-symbiotic interactions took the form of exploitation or - at least - of political dynamics where each side was able to use the other as a tool to achieve its own goals.

Thus, the use of Islam by Arab nationalists goes beyond, for example, the religious regime has been used as a tool to mobilize local and regional support for its Arab socialist agenda - notably through Al-Azhar University - which is used as a means of spreading Arab legitimacy; or as Saddam Hussein repeatedly invoked religion to mobilize Arabs during the 1991 Gulf War; Thus, Islamism was itself used as a tool by the nation-state, and this is what happened at the moment of the re-emergence of Islamism after the seventies of the last century. In Pakistan and Southeast Asia for example, Islamization did not arise only as a challenge to the state, but in fact strengthened the post-colonial states - especially Pakistani and Malaysian - by providing them with an ideological tool that they previously lacked. The strong state approach of Islamists in the Middle East exemplifies the reverse dynamic.

Saddam Hussein
What emerges from this analysis is that the opposition and conflict approach appears to be a fallacy; Islamism and Arab nationalism are not two contradictory ideologies that are completely inseparable and have nothing to do with each other except opposition and conflict. Such a view obscures the complex and intertwined histories of these two highly developed movements, which in many respects can be seen as a mutual basis. However, invalidating this view necessarily means that the opposite is true. In other words, saying that the model of opposition and conflict is often inaccurate is a certain thing on the one hand, while claiming that political Islam and Arabism are two forms of the same thing "two sides of the same coin" is another matter, of course. The question one should attempt to answer now is whether it is possible to go beyond this diversity of interactions described above and identify a unifying element that justifies such a claim.

A common rejection of the West
It will first be seen that both Islamism and pan-Arabism emerge as a reaction to the Western penetration of the region and have similar social functions in this respect. To some extent, the two movements can be correctly seen as forms of this rejection. The first indication of a strong common element is the following observation: Arab and Islamic unity seem to have an inverse relationship: when one rises, the other declines, and when one dominates, the other marginalizes. It can be said that this relationship dates back to the early twentieth century, before the First World War. According to Karen Doisha, the Islamic identity was much stronger among Arabs than the new and marginal concept of the Arab nation.

This relationship was reversed only after World War II, specifically at the beginning of the fifties; Where Arab nationalism overcame Islamism; Arab nationalism was seen as linked - realistically - in local regions, language, history, and experience rather than the abstract and dispersed nation. Islamism almost “disappeared” from the international relations scene, while Arab nationalism rose and reached its zenith in the 1960s under the leadership of Nasser and the projects of the United Arab Republic. The decline of pan-Arabism after 1967 saw the re-emergence of Islamism and the reverse equilibrium began to take shape. To explain this astonishing relationship, one must understand what links Arab nationalism and Islamism. Hence, attention to their common origin; This origin is found in the rejection of the European colonial power that is at the heart of the emergence and spread of the two movements.

As for Islamism, one of his early ideologies, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, described "European imperialism" as a shared experience among Muslims, and sought to mobilize anti-colonial sentiment around a renewed sense of the nation's consciousness. Likewise, Hassan al-Banna, who founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, was concerned with the cultural westernization of the Islamic world and the loss of Islamic traditions. According to Arshin Adeeb Moghaddam: “It is not too exaggerated” to generalize this to the modernist Islamists from Abduh to Khomeini, Sayyid Qutb, Abu Al-Ala Mawdudi, Hassan Al-Banna and Muhammad Iqbal; For them, Islam was the solution to the social, political, economic and cultural decline of the nation compared to the West. For Reinhard Schulze, even the concept of the Islamic state is a reaction to the Western nation-state, and for many authors, Islamism is also a response to the emergence of Zionism, which is considered a Western project.

Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani
The same analysis can be carried out exactly on Arab nationalism, which also sees itself as a means to roll back Western hegemony in the region. A clear example of this is the "foundational" event of Arab unity: Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956, an act that directly targeted former European colonial powers, followed by massive Arab anti-Western demonstrations followed by demonstrations in Libya, Morocco, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and Yemen . It is thus clear that both movements emerge from the same matrix of anti-Western identity. In other words, it is not only identity-based movements that have built this identity against the "other" itself: the West. Thus, they necessarily share basic characteristics: they have the same goal - they are seen as the legitimate source of defining collective identities - which implies a fight for one thing: "authenticity", or as Dawisha puts it. Thus, their successes or failures are subject to the same standards because they are able to deliver on the same promises. It seems that this framework can only explain and explain the inverse relationship shown above. For example, one could make some of the most decisive promises in terms of their bearing on the fate of the two ideologies, including the liberation of Palestine and better economic equality. Thus, their successes or failures are subject to the same standards because they are able to deliver on the same promises. It seems that this framework can only explain and explain the inverse relationship shown above. For example, one could make some of the most decisive promises in terms of their bearing on the fate of the two ideologies, including the liberation of Palestine and better economic equality.

The re-emergence of Islamism stemmed from the failure of Arab nationalism to liberate Palestine in 1967, after the losing June war against Israel. At the moment, Islamism is winning the ideological battle over the same issue it lost after World War II: the ability to represent a credible anti-Western force; Criticizing Arab nationalism for being a mere imitation of European institutions, it was then able to establish itself as an original and unparalleled approach to getting rid of Western influence. A similar argument can be made in the field of political economy: when Arab nationalist forces in the 1970s - facing the economic crisis - proved unable to fulfill their socialist promise of economic equality, Islamism emerged as an alternative, and a new Islamic model of socio-economic justice was proposed.

It may be tempting to conclude from this apparent system of “talkative pots”** that Arabism and Islamism are in fact two sides of the same phenomenon or “two sides of the same coin,” and this phenomenon is the rejection of the hegemony of the West. Although the two movements are different expressions of anti-Western opinion, placing them only within this framework would be unsatisfactory. Such a model would completely ignore the actual content and internal intellectual motives of both ideologies; Elements that are of great importance both in terms of their relationship with each other or in terms of their impact on regional and global international relations.

Divergent ideological tools
In other words, they are both reactions of the West, but these reactions are themselves fundamentally different. In fact, they do not reject the same elements of Western hegemony. They do not fight the West on the same level, and in a way they are not opposed to the same West. While Arab nationalism is fighting a military and political force, Islamism is fighting ideological influence and influence. The 1967 transition moment was instrumental in this respect; When Islamists criticized the failure of Arab nation-states to defeat Israel, this criticism addressed not the incompetence of Arab nationalism or even the irrelevance of the Arab nationalist project at the center of the attack, but rather the so-called “moral bankruptcy” of secular nation-states built on the Western model. Considering this criticism a purely opportunistic position dictated by a power struggle would undoubtedly be a fallacy and reduce the credibility of this criticism.

As John Esposito explains it: "For Qutb - as for Al-Banna and Mawdudi - the West is the historical and entrenched enemy of Islam and Islamic societies, whether it is a political or religious threat. The obvious danger of the West lies in its control over the Muslim elites who rule and direct by standards alien to them." As a result, criticism of Islamism has not only been associated with complaints against Arab nationalist regimes, but has mainly provided a moral indictment of post-Enlightenment political theories. Indeed, this Arab nationalist concept as a product of Western ideologies is justified. The founder of Arab nationalist thought, Satih al-Husari, borrowed from the writings of the German Nationalist School of the Romantic era, and the birth of Arab nationalist sentiment is framed in Woodrow Wilson's terms, as a struggle for "self-determination".

Important manifestations of this ideological gap can be found in national education policies; In the new post-independence nation-states, secular education is strongly promoted, as is evident in Egypt where the school population expands by 800,000 in the years around 1952. A basic ideological divide seems to be forming here: it implies that although Islamists And Arab nationalists are fighting the West alike, for neither are leading the same battle.

On the one hand, as Hedley Poole puts it, "[Arab nationalism] has been on the pain of accommodating Western norms and values ​​while using them to fight the West as a political and military force but not as a civilization. In this sense, Arab nationalism embraces Western ideas." The Arab nationalists' adoption of national liberation discourse, commitment to socialism and the promotion of European forms of state perfectly illustrate Paul's view. On the other hand, Islamism presents itself as a rejection of Western ideas (which Sayyid Qutb described as “this individualism that lacks a sense of interdependence, that animal freedom that is called tolerance”), and Islamism calls for the construction of an alternative political system based on Islamic values . In many respects, Islamism is the ideological weapon of "Islamic modernity" directed against the West. Arab nationalism did not possess such a weapon and does not seek to possess one.

Thus, the view that defines Arab nationalism and Islamism - regardless of their ideological content - as two essential phenomena of the same anti-hegemonic dynamic is incorrect. Such a definition would amount to an overly functional sociological approach, which would somehow rip ideas off ideologies. Conceptually, that definition would commit the fallacy that Descartes warns about in his Discourse on Style: to confuse the origin (in this case, the reaction to the Western penetration of the Middle East) with the base (that reaction).

In addressing the question of whether “Arab nationalism and Islamism are two sides of the same coin,” this article began with an assessment of the opposing position, that is, one who sees these ideologies as two completely different things related only to confronting each other. A variety of interactions and connections are found between these two ideologies, and this claim has been invalidated. A unified model and common origin for these two ideologies were then demonstrated but found to be insufficient to proceed in agreement with the motives discussed. In other words, this article came to the conclusion that Arab nationalism and Islamism - closely intertwined with their origins - emerge from the same anti-Western identity matrix, but the tenor, means, and meanings of this rejection are fundamentally different.

In general, the answer to this article revolves around the issue of the relationship of these movements to the West, which links these two ideologies to each other and distinguishes them from each other. In this sense, the coin analogy may not be inaccurate after all. If it is more than just “two sides” of one thing, it describes two different things made up of the same material and oriented in radically different directions, and may in fact constitute a perfectly fair picture of the relations of Islamism and Arabism.( Alaa Abu Rumaila )

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